Abstract. When the planning horizon is long, and the safe asset grows indefinitely, isoelastic portfolios are nearly optimal for investors who are close to isoelastic for high wealth, and not too risk averse for low wealth. We prove this result in a general arbitrage-free, frictionless, semimartingale model. As a consequence, optimal portfolios are robust to the perturbations in preferences induced by common option compensation schemes, and such incentives are weaker when their horizon is longer. Robust option incentives are possible, but require several, arbitrarily large exercise prices, and are not always convex.
Introduction
Investors pursue long-term goals both by managing their portfolios, and by designing incentives, such as stock and option grants, to align managers' actions with their interests. This paper explores the implications of long-term investment for both portfolio choice and incentive contracts, overcoming their traditional separation in the literature, and some puzzling results that this separation has generated.
Multiple exercise prices also shed light on the ambiguous effects of option grants, and convex incentives in general, on managerial risk-taking. The intuition is that (Carr and Madan, 2001) a portfolio of call and put options can recreate any regular function of the underlying, including incentive contracts of power type x α , α > 0. If the manager's risk aversion is high, the incentives contracts that reduce it correspond to 0 < α < 1, hence are concave, not convex. By contrast, a manager with low risk aversion is motivated to take risks by a package of call options with all strikes, and this convex incentive is robust to changes in stock prices and to long horizons.
Finally, note that this paper focuses on the risk-sharing aspect of contracts, abstracting from moral hazard or adverse selection due to either hidden action or hidden type. (See Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) and Cvitanić and Zhang (2013) for recent surveys in contract theory.) On the other hand, our results allow considerable flexibility in both investment opportunities and preferences.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the model, and presents the main result and its implications. Section 3 lays the groundwork for the proof of the main result, recalling the general duality results of Bouchard et al. (2004) and some auxiliary results that will be used repeatedly in the sequel. The main result is proved for power utilities (p = 0) in Section 4, and for logarithmic utility (p = 0) in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 contains a counterexample illustrating the necessity of our assumptions.
Main Result
2.1. Model and Main Result. We focus on an agent who invests in assets S, thereby affecting total wealth X, as to maximize expected utility from terminal wealth X T at time T : (2.1) max
To encompass the applications below, the utility function U is strictly increasing and concave, but not necessarily continuously differentiable or strictly concave. The model (2.1) has the usual portfolio choice interpretation, in which the agent is an investor, S represents the financial asset(s), X the portfolio value, and U the investor's utility function. A second interpretation is that of the agent as a corporate manager, S a real investment opportunity, and X the firm's value. In this case, the function U combines the manager's preferences and incentives: for example, if the manager receives a compensation equal to F (X T ) and has utility function u, then U (x) = u(F (x)).
A hybrid interpretation (cf. Carpenter (2000) ) is that of a fund manager, who invests in financial assets S, as to maximize the expected payoff of some function U of the terminal fund value.
Formally, there are d + 1 assets available. A safe asset, with price denoted by S 0 , and d risky assets, with prices S = (S 1 , . . . , S d ). These assets are traded continuously, without frictions, and no arbitrage opportunities are available. Let (Ω, F, (F t ) t≥0 , P ) be a filtered probability space satisfying the usual conditions of right-continuity and saturatedness.
Assumption 2.1 (Assets). The safe asset S 0 : [0, ∞) → R is a deterministic, strictly positive function satisfying S 0 t ↑ ∞ as t ↑ ∞.
Moreover, the discounted prices S/S 0 of the risky assets are local martingales under some probability Q equivalent to P .
5
The above assumption lim t→∞ S 0 t = ∞ is satisfied, for example, in models with positive interest rates bounded away from zero. The existence of a martingale measure ensures that the market is free of arbitrage opportunities (cf. Delbaen and Schachermayer (1998) ).
The agent's objective is described by a utility function U , which incorporates the combined effect of preferences and incentives. Henceforth, fix p < 1, and denote byŨ (x) the isoelastic utility function, defined byŨ (x) = x p /p, 0 = p < 1, resp.Ũ (x) = log(x) for p = 0. Compared to the benchmarkŨ , the generic utility function U satisfies the following restrictions, which yield the main result.
Assumption 2.2 (Utility).
i) U (x) : (0, ∞) → R is strictly increasing, concave, not necessarily differentiable or strictly concave for low wealth levels, but differentiable and strictly concave for large enough wealth.
ii) As wealth increases (x ↑ ∞), the utility U becomes similar to the isoelastic utilityŨ , in that their marginal utilities are asymptotically equivalent:
iii) The utility U satisfies additional conditions at low wealth levels, depending on the sign of p iñ
a) For 0 < p < 1, U is bounded from below; b) For p = 0, i.e.,Ũ (x) = log(x),
c) For p < 0, lim x↑∞ U (x) = 0 and (2.3) is satisfied.
Condition i) implies that the agent is risk averse when wealth is high. Condition ii) requires that, when the agent is rich, the utility (either by preferences or by incentives) is close to isoelastic, which is the central assumption in turnpike theorems. In particular, (2.2) implies that U satisfies the Inada condition at infinity, i.e., lim x↑∞ U (x) = 0. However, the Inada condition may not be satisfied at zero.
Condition iii) is new, and requires that U is not too risk averse compared toŨ when wealth is low. For example, if U (x) = x p * /p * for x small, where p * < 1, the condition in (2.3) boils down to p * ≥ p − 1, that is, the risk aversion 1 − p * of U should not be greater than one plus the risk aversion 1 − p ofŨ at low wealth. In general, (2.3) means that the ratio of utilities U (x)/Ũ (x)
does not diverge faster than x −1 for p = 0 or (x log x) −1 for p = 0, as the wealth x tends to zero.
These conditions are satisfied, in particular, if the ratio between U andŨ remains bounded near
5 If the utility function is strictly concave and continuously differentiable, the safe asset can be stochastic as long as it is bounded from below and above by two deterministic processes S and S such that limt→∞ S t = ∞; cf. Remark 3.2.
zero. The example outlined in Section 2.3 and analyzed in Section 6 below shows that if (2.3) is dropped, the main result can fail even in the Black-Scholes model.
The agent invests in the assets subject to the usual budget constraint: if x denotes the initial capital, and (ϕ i t ) 1≤i≤d 0≤t≤T the number of shares on the i-th asset at time t, the corresponding wealth
To simplify notation, without loss of generality we set x = 1, which amounts to scaling the numeraire by a factor of x. An R d -valued process ϕ is an admissible strategy if it is predictable, S-integrable, and the corresponding wealth process satisfies X ϕ t ≥ 0 a.s. for all t ≥ 0. The class of admissible wealth processes is denoted by X := {X : X t ≥ 0, P − a.s. for all t ≥ 0}. Thus, the value functions for the utility maximization problems for the generic utility U and its isoelastic counterpartŨ are:
The final assumption is that the isoelastic utility maximization problem is well posed. This assumption is necessary only for p ≥ 0 because it is always satisfied if the utility function is bounded from above for p < 0:
be the convex dual of the isoelastic utilityŨ , and assume that
where Y is the set of stochastic discount factors:
Condition (2.5) ensures that the isoelastic dual (and in turn primal) problem is well posed. For p = 0, this requires the existence of the q-th moment for some stochastic discount factor, which is satisfied, for example, if the asset price follows an Itô process, and the market price of risk is bounded. Indeed, in this case one can choose the density process of the minimal martingale measure, and (2.5) follows from Novikov's condition. The argument for p = 0 is similar.
With the above notation and assumptions, the main result reads as follows.
Theorem 2.4 (Robustness of Isoelastic Portfolios). Let Assumptions 2.1 -2.3 hold. Then for any horizon T > 0 there exist an optimal payoff X T T for the generic utility U andX T T for the isoelastic utilityŨ .
6 They satisfy (2.6) lim
6 Here, the superscript T indicates the optimal wealth process for horizon T , whereas the subscript T refers to its evaluation at time T .
That is, in the long run, the certainty equivalent of the isoelastic portfolio is arbitrarily close in relative terms to that of the optimizer.
The strength of this result is that the certainty equivalents converge -not just their growth rates. In contrast, the long-run portfolio choice literature based on risk-sensitive control 7 and large deviations 8 focuses on the maximization of the equivalent safe rate, defined as:
It is clear that if two processes (X t ) t≥0 and (X t ) t≥0 satisfy (2.6), then they share the same equivalent safe rate (if it exists). It is also clear, however, that (2.6) is a much stronger property. As a trivial example, even with a risk-neutral utility (U (x) = x), consider the two processesX t = e (µ−σ 2 /2)t+σWt , X t = 1 2 e rt + 1 2 e (µ−σ 2 /2)t+σWt , which correspond to a full stock investment, and to a half-stock, half-bond investment (without rebalancing) in a safe asset earning a constant interest rate r and a stock following geometric Brownian motion with expected return µ > r and volatility σ. Then, both wealth processes have the same growth rate µ, but the ratio of the corresponding certainty equivalents converges to 2. In fact, examples are also available, in which such a ratio diverges while the equivalent safe rate remains equal. Thus, even if two investment policies share the same equivalent safe rate, they may have very different certainty equivalents, which means that the agent may value one policy much higher than the other.
When (2.6) holds, however, the optimal policy can only be marginally better than its isoelastic counterpart for long horizons, in that the gain from choosing the superior policy is smaller than any fraction of the value of the inferior one. It is precisely this property that makes the theorem relevant for incentive schemes, and the next section explores in detail the theorem's implications in this area.
Incentives.
Weakness of incentives with one exercise price. If a manager has isoelastic preferences (Ũ (x) = x p /p with 0 = p < 1), and compensation that includes a cash component c 1 ≥ 0 and a fraction c 2 > 0 of the equity X t , the objective function is
where X runs through the class of admissible wealth processes. Suppose now that shareholders are concerned that the manager's high equity exposure is likely to discourage investment in projects with positive expected value, and are contemplating to grant c 3 > 0 call options with exercise price K, as an incentive to take risks. Such executive stock options typically have a vesting period of ten years, so that our focus on long horizons is relevant. Including the option grant, the manager maximizes the objective Both the optimizer and the certainty equivalent of this problem are the same as for
In other words, awarding the option grant is equivalent to replacing the individual utilityŨ with the effective utilityŪ . This utilityŪ is strictly increasing, differentiable on (K, ∞), and satisfiesŪ (∞) = 0 if p < 0 as well as
Thus, the effective utilityŪ satisfies Assumption 2 for any fixed compensation c 1 ≥ 0, with the exception thatŪ becomes convex in a neighborhood of the exercise price K, which is illustrated in Figure 2 .2. Indeed, creating such convex region is the main purpose of option incentives.
Carpenter ( show that maximizing the expected utilityŪ is actually equivalent to maximizing its concave envelope U , that is, the minimal concave function that dominatesŪ :
In the present setting, the concave envelope coincides withŪ for sufficiently large or small wealth levels, therefore it preserves properties (2.10) ofŪ . Since it is also concave, Theorem 2.4 applies to U , and yields the following result:
9 Which includes a complete market where the unique equivalent martingale measure has no atoms, as well as other settings.
Theorem 2.5. If the manager's problem (2.8) and the concavified problem (2.11) are well posed and have the same solution, and the safe asset grows indefinitely then, as the horizon increases, the certainty equivalents of the optimal strategies with incentives (2.8) and without incentives (2.7) are asymptotically equivalent. In particular, the manager's private value of an option grant with fixed exercise price becomes relatively negligible as the horizon increases.
With hindsight, this result looks natural, and indeed follows from the the local effect on preferences of a single option. Yet, the option pricing intuition, which shapes much of the literature on incentives, points to the opposite conclusion. Since in the Black-Scholes model (and also in more sophisticated extensions) the arbitrage-free price of a call option increases with volatility, it is plausible to conclude that a manager is encouraged to increase its value by taking more risk. A longer horizon also increases the option's value, suggesting a stronger, not weaker incentive effect.
However, option pricing heuristics are misleading in this context because the manager, who can neither sell nor hedge the option grant, 10 does not focus on the hypothetical risk-neutral value of the option, but rather on its private value, for which risk-aversion is central. Since a single option affects risk-aversion only locally, long horizons combined with wealth growth make their impact vanish.
In summary, Theorem 2.4 supports the broad observation that the size and the exercise price of an option grant needs to be chosen carefully, depending on the horizon. A small number of options with too low a strike may result, similar to a large stock position, in discouraging risk-taking. A large number of options with too high strike may also be ineffective, as the risk necessary to make the options profitable may be too much for the manager to bear. And even an exercise price chosen optimally at the time of award may soon become inadequate after large changes in the asset price.
Robustness of several strike prices, and power(ful) incentives. We argue that option grants that include several (in theory, infinitely many) exercise prices retain their incentive effects after large price changes, and are robust to long horizons. Once again, the intuition comes from option theory: Carr and Madan (2001) show that a European option with (smooth) payoff f (S T ) admits the following representation as a portfolio of call and put options of all strikes:
In this representation, the term f (K) represents a cash amount, the term f (K)(S T −K) a position in a forward contract, and the two integrals correspond to portfolios in puts and calls, respectively.
The thresholdK is arbitrary, and determines the strike above which calls rather than puts are used.
For example, settingK = 0, this decomposition shows that a portfolio consisting of an equal number of call options at all strikes leads to a payoff of the form f (x) = cx 2 for some c > 0.
In general, a payoff of power type f (x) = x α is replicated by a portfolio of options with weights 10 In practice, incentive stock options grants include clauses that prevent a manager from taking offsetting positions even with private accounts. 11 The formula follows using the fundamental theorem of calculus twice, and then integrating by parts.
f (x) = α(α − 1)x α−2 . We restrict to α > 0, as otherwise the incentive does not reward higher asset values.
Consider now the effect of such a power incentive on a manager with isoelastic utilityŨ (x) = x p /p.
With fixed compensation set to zero for simplicity, the utility function including incentives becomes U (x) = x αp /p, which means that the incentive replaces the manager's risk aversion γ = 1 − p with the effective risk aversion:
This formula has several implications. First, the incentive reduces risk aversion (γ * < γ) if and
In particular, a convex payoff (α > 1) does not reduce risk aversion if the latter is originally higher than logarithmic (γ > 1), as it typically is. In general, a concave payoff (α < 1) makes a manager closer to logarithmic γ = 1, and a convex payoff does the opposite.
Thus, for a manager who has an already low risk aversion (γ < 1), an options grant that includes calls with several exercise prices is an incentive scheme that remains robust to the horizon, and to large movements in the stock price, preventing the need for future repricing.
The payoff of a concave incentive is qualitatively similar to that of a combination of covered-call positions, but devising concave incentives may not be practical, because they would imply large stock holdings, combined with short positions in options of all maturities. The unusual nature of such arrangements, combined with the resulting difficulties for tax and accounting purposes, may make such schemes hard to implement.
In spite of these difficulties, note that the above formula shows that such concave power incentive are implicit in the high-water mark provisions in the compensation of hedge fund managers. Indeed, Guasoni and Obloj (2013) find that a hedge fund manager with risk aversion γ, who receives as performance fee a fraction 1 − α of profits, invests the fund's assets like an owner-investor with the same effective risk aversion as in (2.13). This observation shows that concave incentives, although virtually absent in corporate compensation, are in fact implicitly present in the hedge-fund industry, and that the typical performance fees of 20% correspond to a power incentive with α = 0.8.
2.3.
Counterexample. This section outlines a counterexample, which shows that Theorem 2.4
can fail even in the usual Black-Scholes model if condition (2.3) is not satisfied, i.e., if the generic utility U is too risk averse compared to the reference isoelastic utilityŨ at low wealth levels. The detailed calculations are presented in Section 6 below.
Suppose the safe asset earns a constant interest rate r > 0, and there is a single risky asset following geometric Brownian motion:
for a standard Brownian motion W t and constants µ, σ > 0. LetŨ (x) = x p /p, p < 0 be a reference isoelastic utility with risk aversion 1 − p > 1 and consider the generic utility function given by U (x) = x p /p for sufficiently large x and by U (x) = x p * /p * , p * < p − 1, for x ≤ 1, with smooth 12 Here, we suppose that the resulting optimization problem is well-posed in the sense of Assumption 2.3; in particular, the effective risk aversion should be positive.
interpolation in between. Then, at high wealth levels, the generic utility U has the same risk aversion 1 − p as its isoelastic counterpartŨ , but the corresponding risk aversion is bigger (by more than 1) at low wealth levels. In particular, a simple calculation shows that the generic utility U does not satisfy (2.3).
In this setting, the optimal isoelastic portfolio X T T can be too risky for the generic utility at low wealth levels, leading to a diminishing ratio of certainty equivalents compared to the optimizer X T T for U in the long run: (2.14) lim
Indeed, we show in Section 6 that this result holds when the risky asset is attractive enough:
To understand this parameter restriction, recall that in this model µ/(σ 2 (1 − p)) is the optimal portfolio weight in the risky asset for the isoelastic utility. Thus, the lower bound (2.15) ensures that the risky asset is sufficiently attractive, compared to the safe asset, to lead to a sufficiently large risky investment. In particular, as the difference p − p * between risk aversions at low wealth levels declines to one, the isoelastic risky weight rises, leading to a sufficiently large probability of reaching low wealth levels. Indeed, the lower bound in (2.15) tends to infinity, as the difference in risk aversions approaches one (p * ↑ p − 1), in line with our main result, which holds if this difference is less than or equal to one.
The result in (2.14) may seem puzzling, because it implies that the properties of the generic utility function at low wealths are important in the long run, even though the safe asset has a positive growth rate, so that any initial safe investment grows arbitrarily, thereby avoiding low wealth with certainty. However, the optimal isoelastic portfolio keeps a constant fraction of wealth in the risky asset. Hence, if the stock price drops and the risky position declines, the safe position is reduced as well, so that wealth can decrease even further.
13 Such a portfolio may be unacceptable for another investor, who is substantially more risk averse at low wealth levels.
Notation and Preliminaries
We begin by recalling the basic notions and duality results for the present non-smooth setting, which have been established by Bouchard et al. (2004) .
Recall the value functions u T andũ T for the generic utility U and its isoelastic counterpartŨ from (2.4). Let
be the dual functions of the generic utility U and the isoelastic utilityŨ , respectively. Define the domain of V as dom(V ) := {y > 0 : |V (y)| < ∞} and let dom(V ) be its closure. Consider the dual 13 As an extreme case, recall that, if risk aversion is small enough, the wealth of the optimal Merton portfolio converges to zero almost surely, even though its expected return is high.
problems associated to (2.4):
where Y denotes the set of stochastic discount factors:
Theorem 3.1 (Bouchard-Touzi-Zeghal) . Suppose the following holds: a) U : (0, ∞) → R is nonconstant, nondecreasing and concave;
c) V satisfies the dual asymptotic elasticity condition
Then, optimal solutions X T ∈ X for u T and Y T ∈ Y for v T exist such that X T Y T is a uniformly integrable martingale and
For isoelastic utilitiesŨ , the same statements hold (cf. Krankov and Schachermayer (1999) ).
We denote the corresponding optimal solutions ofũ T andṽ T byX T andỸ T , respectively. Both of them are unique. Moreover, sinceṼ is differentiable, (3.2) simplifies toX
Remark 3.2. If the generic utility U is differentiable and strictly concave, the aforementioned duality results also hold for a nondeterministic safe asset S 0 , assuming that the latter bounded from above and below by two deterministic, positive processes S and S (cf. (Karatzas andŽitković, 2003, Theorem 3.10) ).
In what follows, we will verify all prerequisites of Theorem 3.1 in our setting. We begin by deriving some consequences of the convergence (2.2) of the ratio of marginal utilities.
Lemma 3.3. Suppose (2.2) holds and let p = 0. Then, for large wealth levels, the generic utility U lies between arbitrarily close multiples of its isoelastic counterpartŨ up to an additive constant.
That is, for any > 0 there exists some sufficiently large M > 0 such that: i) If p ∈ (0, 1), then for some constants A and B ,
Moreover, U is regularly varying at infinity in both cases.
Proof. For any ∈ (0, 1), the convergence (2.2) of the ratio of marginal utilities yields the existence of some sufficiently large M such that
Up to a larger M , we can assume that the generic utility U is differentiable for x ≥ M . When p ∈ (0, 1), integrating (3.5) on (M , x) for x ≥ M gives the estimates in i). When p < 0, integrating (3.5) on (x, ∞) for x ≥ M and using U (∞) = 0 in Assumption 2.2 iii) c) yields the estimates in ii). As for the regular variation of U , the bounds in i) give
Since was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that lim sup x→∞ U (cx)/U (x) ≤ c p . The converse statement lim inf x→∞ U (cx)/U (x) ≥ c p is obtained analogously. Hence, U is regularly varying at infinity. The regular variation of U for the case p < 0 is obtained along the same lines.
Since U is differentiable and strictly concave at sufficiently large wealth levels (cf. Assumption 2.2 i)), the subdifferential −∂V (y) is single-valued and equals (U ) −1 (y) when y ∈ (0, y 0 ) for some sufficiently small y 0 > 0. Set Proof. Set x = I(y), which tends to infinity as y ↓ 0. Then, (3.6) follows from I(y)
where the convergence holds due to (2.2).
Let us now verify the prerequisites of Theorem 3.1. Proof. We prove the statement for the case p < 0; the proofs for 0 < p < 1 and p = 0 are similar.
Since U is increasing with lim x↑∞ U (x) = 0, we have U (x) − xy ≤ 0 for any x, y > 0. Therefore, V (y) ≤ 0 for any y > 0. To obtain a lower bound for V , recall the second inequality in (3.4), which gives a lower bound for U for x ≥ M . For the same M , (2.3) implies the existence of C M < 0 such that U (x) ≥ C M x p−1 for x < M . Hence, when y is small, V (y) is bounded from below by the convex dual of (1 + )x p /p, which is −(1 + ) is uniformly bounded from above. Hence, u T < ∞ for any T > 0 as well. When 0 ≤ p < 1, the same argument as in the case p < 0 gives V (y) ≤ (1 + )Ṽ (y) +D , y ≤ y , for someD . Since V (y) is decreasing, V (y) is also bounded from above for y ≥ y . Combining this upper bound for V (y) with Assumption 2.3 gives v T (y) < ∞, for any T > 0 and y > 0. Hence u T is also finite, due to the duality relation u T ≤ inf y>0 (v T (y) + y).
The previous three lemmata verify all assumptions in Theorem 3.1, hence the statements therein hold. For the isoelastic problemũ T , we recall from (Guasoni and Robertson, 2012 , Lemma 5) the following duality result, which will be frequently used below.
Lemma 3.8. Let X, Y be F T -measurable random variables such that X, Y > 0 almost surely and
and equality holds if and only if E[XY ] = 1 and X p−1 = αY for some α > 0.
Finally, lim T →∞ S 0 T = ∞ in Assumption 2.1 implies the following long-run property for stochastic discount factors:
Indeed, a full safe investment is admissible, so that the supermartingale property of S 0 Y yields First, consider the case p = 0. Recall from Lemma 3.3 that the generic utility U is regularly varying at infinity. As a result, the convergence (2.6) of the ratio of certainty equivalents follows from the convergence of the ratio of the respective utilities:
Lemma 4.1. Let Assumptions 2.1 -2.3 hold. Then (2.6) holds provided that
Proof. To simplify notation, set
, and note that a T , b T ≥ 0 and a T ≥ b T .
Observe that lim
T )] = ∞ follows from lim x↑∞ U (x) = ∞ (cf. the first inequality in (3.3)) and Assumption 2.1. In view of (4.1), we also have lim T →∞ E[U (X T T )] = ∞. As U −1 (∞) = ∞, this confirms that lim T →∞ a T = lim T →∞ b T = ∞. When p < 0, the argument is analogous, with the difference that U (∞) = 0, whence both expected utilities converge to zero, and therefore certainty equivalents are also become infinite. Now, prove (2.6) by contradiction. Suppose that, for any > 0, there exists a subsequence {T n } n≥0 such that a Tn /b Tn ≥ 1 + . For p ∈ (0, 1), the regular variation of U at infinity implies that lim inf
For p < 0, the inequality U (b Tn ) < 0 and the regular variation of U at infinity imply that lim sup
and both inequalities above contradict (4.1).
To prove Theorem 2.4, it therefore remains to show the following:
Proposition 4.2. Let Assumptions 2.1 -2.3 hold. Then
In order to compare the utilities E[U (X T T )] and E[U (X T T )] as T → ∞, compare both of them to the maximal isoelastic utilities E[(X
. Henceforth, we prove Proposition 4.2 separately for 0 < p < 1 and p < 0, since the contribution of low wealth levels requires a different treatment in each case.
4.1. Proof of Proposition 4.2 for 0 < p < 1. We first focus on the isoelastic portfolioX T T .
Lemma 4.3. Let Assumptions 2.1 -2.3 hold. Then:
Proof. To simplify notation, the superscript T inX T T is omitted throughout this proof. By (3.3),
Note that U (X T ) is uniformly bounded from below because this is assumed for the generic utility
by Assumption 2.1, this implies that the first two terms on both sides of (4.3) converge to zero as T → ∞. Now, focus on the third terms. Define an auxiliary probability measure
, where the expectation is finite by Lemma 3.7. Recall from Section 3 thatỹ TỸ T T =X p−1 T and,
for any admissible wealth process X. This inequality yields that (4.6) lim
Indeed, choosing X T = S 0 T in (4.5), it follows that
for any positive L and N . Combined with Assumption 2.1, this yields lim sup
which confirms (4.6) because L was arbitrary. Now, coming back to the third term of the upper and lower bounds in (4.3),
where the convergence follows from (4.6). Therefore, the above estimates on both sides of (4.3)
This proves the assertion because was chosen arbitrarily.
The proof of Proposition 4.2 (and hence the main result) now proceeds as follows. The lower
On the other hand, the optimality of X T T for the generic utility
Therefore, Proposition 4.2 follows by showing lim sup
In view of Lemma 4.3, it suffices to prove that lim sup
To establish this inequality, we begin with the following auxiliary result:
Lemma 4.4. Suppose Assumptions 2.1 -2.3 hold and let p ∈ (0, 1). Then:
Proof. To simplify notation, we omit the superscript T in X T ,X T , Y T , andỸ T throughout this proof. For the M in (3.5), the martingale property of XY implies
(4.7)
Here, the second identity uses the first-order condition U (X T ) = y T Y T when X T ≥ M , and the inequality follows from the second inequality in (3.5). The second term on the right-hand side of (4.7) vanishes as T → ∞ due to (3.7). For the first term, note that E[X TŶT ] ≤ 1 for anyŶ ∈ Y.
Hence, it follows from Lemma 3.8 that
The previous inequality and p > 0 imply that
Coming back to (4.7), the above estimates for the two terms on the right-hand side yield (4.9) 1 1 + ≤ lim inf
For any > 0, (3.6) shows that there exists a sufficiently small δ < y 0 , so that (4.10)
Fix such a δ ; the martingale property of XY then implies
where the second identity follows from X T = I(y T Y T ) for y T Y T ≤ δ . Continue by estimating the second term on the right-hand side. Let V − be the increasing left derivative of the convex function V . Then −V − (y) dominates all other elements of the subdifferential −∂V at y, i.e., −V − (y) ≥ x for any x ∈ −∂V (y). Moreover, again since −V − is nonincreasing, there exists C δ such that x ≤ C δ for any x ∈ −∂V (y) and y > δ . In view of (3.2), it therefore follows that X T ≤ C δ when y T Y T > δ .
As a result, (3.7) gives
Turning to the first term on the right-hand side of (4.11), it follows from the first inequality in (4.10) that
( 4.12) Here, the second term tends to zero as the horizon grows because
due to (3.7). These estimates together with (4.11) and (4.12) imply that
Raising both sides to the power (1 − p), and using the optimality ofỸ for the dual problemṽ T in (3.1), we obtain 1
Together with (4.9), and recalling that was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that
Combining this with E[Ỹ
Lemma 3.8) yields the assertion.
We are now ready to complete the proof for Proposition 4.2, and hence the main Theorem 2.4, for the case 0 < p < 1.
Proof of Proposition 4.2 for 0 < p < 1. We continue to omit the superscript T to ease notation. As discussed before Lemma 4.4, it suffices to show (4.13) lim sup
The second inequality in (3.3) implies
.
(4.14)
As we have seen in the proof of Lemma 4.3, the first two terms on the right-hand side vanish as T → ∞. For the third term, it follows from Lemma 3.8 that Lemma 3.8) . Therefore the previous estimates together with (4.14) imply lim sup
where the last identity follows from Lemma 4.4. Hence, Assertion (4.13) is confirmed because was chosen arbitrarily.
4.2.
Proof of Proposition 4.2 for p < 0. The overall strategy is similar to the case 0 < p < 1.
However, the contribution of low wealth levels to the total expected utility is more delicate, as utilities may be unbounded from below near zero and the value functions u T andũ T converge to zero rather than infinity as T → ∞.
14 Therefore, the additional Assumptions (2.3) on U are needed to ensure that the contribution of low wealth levels is still negligible in the long run. We start with the following analogue of Lemma 4.3.
Lemma 4.5. Let Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 hold. Then:
Proof. To simplify notation, the superscript T inX T andỸ T is omitted throughout this proof. In view of (3.4), we have
. Let us estimate separately the two terms in the upper and lower bounds. For the second term, similar arguments as in the proof of Lemma 4.3, utilizing the auxiliary measure P T , yield (4.16) lim
Compared to the proof of Lemma 4.3, the case p < 0 differs with respect to the estimation of the first term in the upper and lower bounds in (4.15). Here, the first-order conditionX
and the martingale property ofỸX imply E[X p T ] =ỹ T . On the other hand, it follows from (2.3) that pU (x) ≤ C M x p−1 for some constant C M > 0 and any x < M . As a result:
(4.17)
Therefore, the first terms of the upper and lower bounds in (4.15) vanish as the horizon grows.
Together with (4.15) and (4.16), it follows that
This yields the assertion because ε was arbitrary.
Remark 4.6. The calculation of the contribution from low wealth levels relative to the expected power utility in (4.17) will be used in the counterexample in Section 6. Therefore, for future reference, we summarize it here: for any M and U satisfying (2.3),
A careful examination of (4.17) shows that U does not need to be concave to ensure the above convergence.
Similarly as in the case 0 < p < 1, the proof of Proposition 4.2 (and hence the main result) now proceeds as follows. The optimality of X T T for the utility
Therefore, Proposition 4.2 follows by showing
Due to Lemma 4.5, it suffices to prove lim inf
which will be established in the sequel. The following auxiliary result is the analogue of Lemma 4.4:
Lemma 4.7. Suppose Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 hold for p < 0. Then, even without assuming (2.3):
Proof. To simplify notation, we once more omit the superscript T in X T ,X T , Y T , andỸ T throughout this proof. Coming back to (4.11) and using the second inequality in (4.10), (4.18) where q = p/(p − 1). Now, repeating the argument after (4.11), the second term on the right-hand side vanishes as T → ∞. Then, raise both sides of (4.18) to the (1 − p)-th power, obtaining
where the second inequality follows from the optimality ofỸ for the dual problemṽ T in (3.1).
On the other hand, for any fixed a > 0, it follows from (2.2) that
Hence, for any > 0, there is M ,a > 0 such that U (x) exists and
The martingale property of XY , the first-order condition y T Y T = U (X T ) for large X T , and the first inequality in (4.21) in turn yield
By (3.7), the first two terms on the right-hand side go to zero as T → ∞. Therefore:
Let us estimate the second term on the right-hand side below. To this end, p < 0 and X T ≥ 0 imply that 1 23) where the last step is once again a consequence of (3.7). Here, δ M is a positive constant such that
The reason for the existence of such a constant is the following.
Note that X T ∈ −∂V (y T Y T ) and that every element x ∈ −∂V (y) dominates −V + (y), where
is the right derivative of V at y. Since V (y) is strictly convex when y is close to zero, −V + is strictly decreasing. Together with −V + (0) = ∞, this implies the existence of δ M > 0 such that
In view of (4.23), the second term on the right-hand side of (4.22) vanishes as the horizon grows,
≤ 1 for anyŶ ∈ Y. Hence, Lemma 3.8 shows
Taking into account that lim T →∞ E[Ŷ T ] = 0 and p < 0, the previous two inequalities imply
In particular, this holds for Y T andỸ T . Combining this inequality with (4.19) and recalling that was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that 1 = lim
Together with
T ] =ỹ T (cf. Lemma 3.8), this yields the assertion.
We are now ready to complete the proof of Proposition 4.2 and hence Theorem 2.4 in the case p < 0.
Proof of Proposition 4.2 for p < 0. As discussed before Lemma 4.7, it suffices to show that
Fix a > 0. Recall that lim x↑∞ U (x)/(x + a) p−1 = 1 by (4.20). As in (3.4), it follows that
The first of these estimates gives
, where p < 0 and U ≤ 0 are used to obtain the inequality. We have seen in (4.23) that
Since E[X p T ] =ỹ T and lim T →∞ y T /ỹ T = 1 by Lemma 4.7, it follows that
and in turn (4.28) lim inf
. 
Since was arbitrary, this proves (4.26) and in turn Proposition 4.2.
Proof of the main result for p = 0
If p = 0, the isoelastic utilityŨ is logarithmic and -compared to the power case p = 0 -different arguments are needed to establish the main result. In this case, the convergence (2.2) of the ratio of marginal utilities implies the following:
Lemma 5.1. Suppose (2.2) holds. Then, for any > 0, there exists a sufficiently large M such
Proof. For any ∈ (0, 1), the same argument as in Item i) of Lemma 3.3 yields the existence of M such that
and constants A , B . The lower bound implies lim x↑∞ U (x) = ∞. Set y = U (x); then, x ↑ ∞ as y ↑ ∞. Combined with the convergence of ratio of marginal utilities (2.2), this yields
Therefore, 1 − ≤ (log U −1 (y)) ≤ 1 + for y ≥ M , after enlarging M if necessary. The assertion then follows from integrating these inequalities on (b, a) for a ≥ b ≥ M .
In the long run, the generic expected utility diverges, both for the corresponding optimal portfolio and for its isoelastic counterpart:
Lemma 5.2. Let Assumptions 2.1 -2.3 hold. Then
Proof. Once again, the superscript T for X T ,X T , andỸ T is omitted throughout this proof. Since
] by optimality of X T for the generic utility U , the first convergence is implied by the second one. To prove the second convergence, first note that the lower bound in (5.1) yields
Here, the last convergence holds because the optimality ofX T for the logarithmic utility implies
Now, turn to the contribution of the low wealth levels {X T < M }. To this end, Assumption (2.3) guarantees the existence of
Recall from Section 3 thatX
15 In view of (3.7), the term on the right-hand side therefore converges to zero as T → ∞, so that lim inf
with (5.2), this confirms the second (and in turn the first) convergence in the assertion.
As we have seen above, a T ≥ b T and both utilities tend to infinity as T → ∞. In view of Lemma 5.1, the convergence U −1 (a T )/U −1 (b T ) → 1 of the ratio of corresponding certainty equivalents is thereby equivalent to the difference a T − b T of utilities vanishing in the long run. This is in contrast to the power case p = 0, where the convergence of the ratio of certainty equivalents was found to be equivalent to the convergence of the ratio a T /b T of utilities in Lemma 4.1. As a result, different estimates are needed in the case p = 0. More specifically, the proof of the main result is based on the following long-run asymptotics in this case, whose technical proof is deferred to Section 5.1. Proposition 5.3. Let p = 0 and suppose Assumptions 2.1 -2.3 hold. Then:
Here, P − lim T →∞ denotes convergence in P-probability.
With Proposition 5.3 at hand, we can now complete the proof of the main result also in the case
Proof of Theorem 2.4 for p = 0. The superscript T for X T ,X T , andỸ T is again omitted throughout this proof. As discussed above, due to Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2, it suffices to prove For any > 0, the convergence (2.2) of the ratio of marginal utilities implies that there exists a sufficiently large M such that xU (x) ≤ 1 + for x ≥ M . As a result:
Choosing x = X T andx = X T in the previous inequality leads to 4) where the first inequality holds because U (X T ) < U (X T ) when X T <X T . Now, observe that
and, moreover,
where the last inequality holds due to the numeraire property ofX T , i.e., E[X T /X T ] ≤ 1 for any admissibleX (cf. (4.5) with p = 0). As a result, de la Vallee-Poussin's criterion as in (Shiryaev, 1996 , Lemma 3) implies that the family log
∨ 1 is uniformly integrable in T . Together with Proposition 5.3 iii), this yields
In view of (5.4), it follows that lim sup
In the next two paragraphs, we will show lim sup
Combining these three inequalities then yields (5.3), and in turn completes the proof of Theorem 2.4 in the case p = 0.
To establish (5.6), note that Proposition 5.3 ii) gives lim sup
On the other hand, the upper bound on the generic utility U in (5.1) implies
Now, Proposition 5.3 iii) and the uniform integrability established in the derivation of (5.5) show that the first term on the right-hand side converges to zero as T → ∞. Likewise, by Proposition 5.3 i), the second term also tends to zero as the horizon grows, confirming (5.6).
To prove (5.7), note that lim inf
by Proposition 5.3 ii). It therefore suffices to show
To this end, (2.3) yields the existence of
Together with the first-order conditionX
T =ỹ TỸ T withỹ T ≡ 1 and (3.7), it follows that
Therefore ( Proof. The proof follows the argument in Lemma 4.4, where many estimates are simplified when p = 0. Indeed, on the one hand, the same estimate as in (4.7) yields
Here, the second term vanishes as T → ∞ due to (3.7), so that (5.9) 1 1 + ≤ lim inf
On the other hand, the same argument that leads to (4.11) also yields
where the second term on the right-hand side vanishes as T → ∞ by the same reasoning as after (4.11). Concerning the first term, (3.6) for p = 0 shows that I(y) ≥ (1 − )y −1 for any y < δ and some sufficiently small δ . Therefore:
Here the second term also tends to zero because 1
due to (3.7). Combining the above estimates, we obtain (5.10) 1 1 − ≥ lim sup
Thus, the assertion follows by combining (5.9) and (5.10) because ε was arbitrary.
Using the previous results, we can now verify the first two items of Proposition 5.3.
Lemma 5.5. Let p = 0 and suppose Assumptions 2.1 -2.3 hold. Then:
Proof. Recall the numeraire property (4.5) of the log-optimal portfolioX: E[X T /X T ] ≤ 1 for any T and any admissible payoffX. The first part of the assertion in turn follows verbatim as in the derivation of (4.6), where P T is replaced by P. As for the second part of the assertion, for any N > 0, there exists y N such that I(y) > N for y ≤ y N . Here, y N is chosen sufficiently small so that −∂V (y) is single valued and is denoted by I(y) for y ≤ y N . For the chosen N ,
The second term on the right vanishes as T → ∞, due to (3.7), lim T →∞ y T /ỹ T = 1, andỹ T ≡ 1 (cf. Lemma 5.4). The first term is identically zero, because X T = I(y T Y T ) > N on {y T Y T ≤ y N }.
Therefore, the second part of the assertion follows.
To complete the proof of Proposition 5.3, it remains to verify Item iii). To this end, some auxiliary results are established first.
Lemma 5.6. Suppose Assumptions 2.1 -2.3 hold for p = 0. Then:
Proof. For any > 0, the convergence of the ratio of marginal utilities (2.2) implies the existence of M such that U (x) is differentiable beyond M and, moreover, xU (x) ≥ 1 − /2 for x ≥ M . For such a M , (5.11) P(X T Y T ≤ 1 − ) ≤ P(X T Y T ≤ 1 − , X T ≥ M ) + P(X T < M ). Now, estimate the expectation on the right-hand side. On the set {X T Y T ≤ r T ≤ 1} we have
≤P(X T Y T ≤ 1 − ) + 2 , for any > 0.
Lemma 5.6 shows that the first term on the right vanishes as T → ∞. Since was chosen arbitrarily, this yields (5.14) lim
On {1 ≤ r T ≤ X T Y T } we have X T Y T /r T + r T ≥ 2 and in turn (1 − X T Y T /r T )(1 − r T ) ≤ X T Y T − 1.
As a consequence:
Since was chosen arbitrarily and the second term on the right-hand side converges to 0 by Corollary 5.7, we obtain (5.15) lim
Together, (5.13), (5.14) and (5.15) yield the assertion.
We are now ready to complete the proof of Proposition 5.3 iii).
Proof of Proposition 5.3 iii). Lemma 5.8 implies P−lim T →∞ (1−X T Y T /r T )(1−r T ) = 0. Combined with Lemma 5.6, this yields the assertion P − lim T →∞ r T = 1.
Analysis of the Counterexample
In this section, we provide a detailed analysis of the counterexample from Section 2.3. Recall that U (x) = x p /p, p < 0 for sufficiently large x and U (x) = x p * /p * , p * < p − 1, for x ≤ 1. In what follows, we will show that if (2.15) is satisfied, then (6.1) lim
= ∞ and lim sup
